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ABSTRACT 
This paper motivates the focus of EU cohesion policy at large and the territorial cooperation 
tools on the economic development of territories featuring impoverishing growth associated 
to low population density. An innovative policy approach to help solving this problem in many 
Member  States  is  put  forward  here.  It  is  based  on  the  economic  concept  of  “collective 
efficiency”. It should be understood as a proposal to improve EU cohesion policy in the next 
programming  period.  As  such,  the  paper  suggests  actual  ideas  to  be  included  in  the 
forthcoming  Common  Strategic  Framework  and  Development  and  Investment  Partnership 
Contracts. 
1  Introduction 
The European Commission is running a public consultation on the future shape of cohesion 
policy. This paper responds to the challenge  in two ways. First, it puts forward a specific 
regional development policy initiative to address the competitiveness deficit of extensive areas 
of the European Union (EU). Second, the paper makes clear what changes on the strategic 
guidelines and operational framework of cohesion policy are necessary to implement that 
initiative. 
Our contribution here makes use of Baleiras (2010) whose Subsection 8.1 sketches a cross-
border  operational  programmes  architecture  suitable  to  handle  two  different  economic 
geographies in EU border regions: urbanised areas and low population density territories.
1 In 
this paper, we expand the basic insight from the latter geography to build up an integrated 
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cohesion policy perspective able to deal with the economic development prospects of border 
and  non-border  territories  featuring  population  to  land  ratios  significantly  below  the  EU 
average and a number of cumulative development losses when compared to highly urbanised 
territories. The losses include population ageing and outmigration, entrepreneurship deficit, 
thin institutional thickness, scarce private investment and job creation, high unemployment, 
which,  in  turn,  self-feed  successive  similar  loss  waves  in  a  circular  vicious  path.  Although 
macroeconomic  variables  may  show  a  positive  evolution  in  absolute terms,  the  long-term 
contrast with core territories suggests this vicious circle is trapping such places in a relative 
impoverishing development pattern. A particular attention is also paid here to low density 
territories close to European domestic borders, with specific amendment recommendations 
regarding the territorial cooperation toolbox. 
Yet, many low density territories also house extremely valuable assets upon which it makes 
sense to work out a cooperative action strategy. Based on the economic concept of “collective 
efficiency”, we argue how it is possible to penetrate the vicious circle with sustainable virtuous 
development elements, thus breaking the chain of relative impoverishment. This is where 
cohesion policy comes in. Its method is highly relevant to trigger the appropriate collective 
actions leading to territorial competitiveness in these spaces. In particular, we will also discuss 
how the territorial cooperation objective should be mobilised to optimise the policy response 
effectiveness. 
Low density territories trapped with vicious development circles are not exclusive of border 
regions. To be fair, cohesion policy rules currently in force do not preclude Member States 
from conceiving and implementing actual policy instruments in line with the vision we have 
just outlined. An example of this possibility is provided by Portugal, where such tool is now 
implemented—the  PROVERE  initiative,  the  acronym  standing  for  Programmes  for  the 
Economic Enhancement of Endogenous Resources.
2 However, this is not an easy task given the 
relatively weak knowledge among policy-makers about the merits of collective efficiency, the 
mono-fund  rule  of  operational  programmes,  the  insufficient  coordination  with  rural 
development and fisheries structural action policies and the excessive sectoralisation of 
National Strategic Reference Frameworks. So, the policy solution we envisage in this paper 
makes sense for both border and non-border rural territories. As we will see, appropriate 
European-level political guidelines at the forefront of the forthcoming programming period are 
necessary in both cases for adequate implementation of the suggested policy solution. 
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Our proposal is very much aligned with structural political orientations in Europe. The initiative 
is one way to deliver the territorial cohesion just added by the Lisbon Treaty
3 and finds comfort 
in the objectives of the new European economic development strategy—Europe 2020. Indeed, 
competitiveness inducement in deprived rural territories is expected to make a difference in 
the achievement of the poverty relief headline target—European Commission (2010a, p. 9)—
and to contribute to the sustainable growth priority (p. 12) as rural territories matter a lot for 
biodiversity and green policy objectives and the methodology of the suggested instrument 
(collective efficiency strategies) relies in a more efficient resource allocation. The proposal is 
intrinsically  a  place-based  approach  to  economic  development,  which  goes  along  with  the 
Barca (2009)  report, the conclusions of the  fifth report on economic, social and territorial 
cohesion—European Commission (2010c)—relating to the post-2013 cohesion policy and also 
the  EU  Budget  Review  proposals  for  more  effective  cross-policy  coordination—European 
Commission (2010b). At the concluding section, we will spell out the specific guidelines in 
these community framing documents that our proposal helps to implement. 
The  following  sections  discuss  in  some  detail  the topics we  have  just  sketched.  Section 2 
outlines the relevant economic rationale behind the policy instrument proposal.  Its target 
territories and the political problem to face are described in Section 3, which includes a bird’s 
eye of the instrument. The policy approach we envisage to help solving the problem at hands 
is detailed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2  Conceptual background 
In  order  to  fully  justify  the  new  policy  instrument,  it  seems  instructive  to begin  with  the 
presentation  of  the  relevant  theoretical  backstage.  Regional  development  policies  are 
undergoing a major architectural shift and our proposal fits in the so-called new paradigm of 
such policies. The first subsection thus introduces this model. The ensuing heading shows how 
our approach contributes to affirm cohesion as the economic development policy of Europe. 
The final subsection explains the collective efficiency concept and why it is a competitiveness 
driver. 
2.1  The new paradigm of regional development policies 
For decades, regional development policies round the world have pursued redistributive goals 
more or less explicitly. Either through transfers to lower government levels or direct subsidies 
to social and private institutions, taxpayers’ money has been channelled to regions lagging 
behind in prosperity levels without much concern as to the outcome of the financial transfers 
on the ultimate capacity of recipient territories to engender sustainable jobs and business 
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dynamics. EU cohesion policy and its national applications have long insisted on subsidising the 
provision of infrastructure and collective facilities in lagging behind regions. This approach has 
certainly  had  positive  transitory  real  impacts,  via  aggregate  demand  shocks,  reinforced 
considerably and durably the equitable access of citizens to collective services regardless of 
their residence but the long term impact on output and employment remained clearly below 
the expectations. At the same time, economic theory on growth and development evolved and 
credited  increasingly  the  endogenous  forces  for  the  effectiveness  of  long  term  economic 
performances—see Stimson et al. (2009) for a comprehensive analysis of this evolution (in Ch. 
1)  and  a  new  analytical  framework  to  understand  regional  endogenous  development 
(summarised  in  the  so-called  “regional  competitiveness  performance  cube”  in  Ch.  2  and 
developed  in  the  following  chapters).  The  social  environment  in  which  business  relations 
evolve  is  now  seen  as  a  major  explanation  for  the  responses  of  local  economies  to  both 
domestic  and  external  shocks.  Social  features  such  as  trust,  entrepreneurship,  leadership, 
cooperation,  institutional  capacity  are  key  drivers  to  deliver  life  quality,  i.e.,  regional 
development, to citizens—Baleiras (2011b). 
A number of developed countries has initiated in recent years a different policy approach to 
regional development issues. The economic potential of this shift, where the EU at large and a 
few Member States in particular are worth mentioning, led the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) to acknowledge it as a move towards a new paradigm for 
regional development policies. The shift consists basically on moving away from: 
  performance-independent  subsidies  based  on  actual  interregional  asymmetries 
towards  performance-oriented  investment  grants,  grants  that  induce  behaviours 
headed to territorial competitiveness enhancements; 
  separate, independent sectoral approaches towards integrated, multisectoral solutions 
(which calls for horizontal governance solutions); 
  top-down  policy  design  and  implementation  towards  shared  vertical  governance 
solutions. 
OECD (2009, p. 29) describes the new paradigm in the following way. “In response to poor 
outcomes, regional policy has evolved and is evolving from a top-down, subsidy based group of 
interventions designed to reduce regional disparities, into a much broader ‘family’ of policies 
designed to improve regional competitiveness and characterised by: 1) a strategic concept or 
development strategy that covers a wide range of direct and indirect factors that affect the 
performance  of  local  firms;  2)  a  focus  on  endogenous  assets,  and  less  on  exogenous 
investments and transfers; 3) an emphasis on opportunity rather than on disadvantage; 4) a 
collective/negotiated governance approach involving national, regional and local government 
plus  other  stakeholders,  with  the  central  government  taking  a  less  dominant  role.  The 
rationale of the new regional approach is based on the principle that opportunities for growth 
exist in the entire territory, across all types of regions (...). The aim is to maximise national 
output by assisting and encouraging each individual region to reach their growth potential 5 
 
endogenously, and thus it departs from the old view which regards regional polices as a zero 
sum game (...). Evidence of this so-called ‘paradigm shift’ in regional policy can be seen in 
recent reforms of regional policy in a number of OECD countries”. 
2.2  Cohesion policy: the economic development policy of the EU 
To  be  fair,  until  the  current  programming  period,  there  were  few  elements  of  the  new 
parading in mainstream EU cohesion policy. The most innovative calls to endogenous forces 
prior to the current programming period lied on the territorial cooperation goal, although too 
far away from the growth and jobs spirit. The emphasis on redistributive approaches that 
dominated the policy goals with stronger financial muscle until 2007 relied on the neoclassical 
proposition that regional productivity (or per capita output) disparities tend to disappear in 
the long run provided that regions converge in terms of capital intensity. Yet, territories matter 
for development progress, even if we reduce this notion to real per capita GDP convergence. 
Initial conditions differ not only in terms of capital to labour ratios but also in terms of many 
other resources—physical as well as intangible assets—that neoclassical economics neglects—
culture,  traditions,  self-esteem,  sense  of  belonging,  trust,  creativity,  institutional  capacity, 
cooperation  practices  among  economic  agents,  urbanisation  patterns,  and  so  on.  This 
territorial diversity interacts with  goods and services production and business transactions 
activity, and the direction of impacts is unclear in abstract terms. Such diversity would have to 
disappear for the neoclassical proposition to hold. One should also remark two points: firstly, 
income  distribution  is  inherently  an  interpersonal  income  allocation  matter,  not  an 
interregional  income  allocation  issue;  secondly,  as  a  corollary,  if  the  political  aim  is  to 
redistribute income, then governments should redistribute income—public actions other than 
regional policy (e.g., social security budget operations and social policy at large) should then be 
improved because they are more effective to achieve that purpose. 
The new paradigm to which pioneering countries are moving over the last ten years is about 
unleashing the development potential that is present in every place and about expanding that 
capacity. It requires an  integrated economic development  policy perspective, multisectoral 
approaches,  horizontal  policy  co-ordination  and  adequate  subsidiarity  to  bring  all  relevant 
territorial stakeholders onboard during policy design and policy implementation. 
By embracing, for the first time in its history, a comprehensive economic development strategy 
for  Europe  (the  Lisbon  strategy),  cohesion  policy  at  the  community  level  has  encouraged 
Member States to enter the new paradigm in 2007—see the Community Strategic Guidelines 
for  the  2007/2013  programming  period.  It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  EU  has  no  other 
toolbox headed for long term economic performance. In other words, there is no substitute for 
cohesion policy as the economic development policy of EU at large and Member States in 
particular. The ongoing strategic discussion on the future of cohesion policy seems to head 
clearly  towards  reinforcing  the  alignment  with  the  so-called  new  paradigm  of  regional 6 
 
development  policies.  This  possibility,  pointed  out  since  the  first  ministerial  meeting  that 
discussed  the  subject  (Azores,  November  2007),  is  now  much  more  mature,  as  one  can 
appraise in the Barca report—Barca (2009)—and, especially, in the conclusions of the fifth 
cohesion report—European Commission (2010c). 
If this vision prevails, all three current objectives of cohesion policy will need to be restyled. In 
this context, and given this paper’s object, one word about European territorial cooperation 
seems worthwhile. As referred to earlier, this, often mentioned, third pillar of the policy was 
quick to realise the usefulness of social environments as catalysts for economic change. The 
current fast track Commission’s initiative under interregional cooperation is a good example of 
this political perception. In her speech at the territorial cohesion green paper presentation 
ceremony (Brussels, 2008), Mrs Hübner, by then the Regional Policy Commissioner, stated that 
the new objective set by the Lisbon Treaty requires three “C”s: Concentration, Connection and 
Cooperation.  We  strongly  believe the  latter  “C”  calls  for  a  refinement of  actual  territorial 
cooperation mechanisms in line with the emerging regional policy paradigm. The European 
Commission is being very active in the area of macro-region foundations, which is a good 
thing, but clearly a new focus on cross-border and interregional cooperation dimensions is very 
much necessary. We hope to show the usefulness and feasibility of a reform in that direction 
to tackle the development problem of low density territories close to domestic borders. 
2.3  Collective efficiency and competitive advantage 
We now move back to economic theory to complete the rationale for a policy approach to the 
vicious circle of low density territories in the EU. Endogenous development theory looks very 
promising to refine cohesion policy and its national declinations. In particular, we find the 
collective  efficiency  concept  introduced  by  Hubert  Schmitz  very  inspiring  for  our  subject 
matter. The concept links the neoclassical notion of external economies of agglomeration and 
networking with the industrial districts literature.
4 Although less mediatic than the classical 
structural explanations for growth and development improvement (education, competition, 
justice,...)  collective  efficiency  is,  in  many  circumstances,  a  serious  and  relatively  fast 
competitiveness deliver. It deserves more public awareness, chiefly among policy-makers. 
Collective efficiency derives from two key ideas. First, physical proximity of agents facilitates 
the occurrence of positive externalities (the so-called external economies of agglomeration), a 
concept that goes back to Alfred Marshall, one of the neoclassical economics parents. In his 
much acclaimed 1890 The  Principles of Economics textbook, Marshal coins the concept of 
external  economies  to  express  the  benefits  an  individual  firm  reaps  from  “the  general 
development of the industry”.
5 
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The second background idea is joint actions. As explained with more detail in Baleiras (2011b), 
those  benefits  are  incidental,  they  happen  by  chance  because  they  are  not  the  result  of 
conscious and deliberate actions on the part of other firms. Agglomeration economies are a 
persuasive factor to explain firm clustering, yet they are not sufficient to explain why some 
clusters grow and eventually go international while others stagnate or even shrink after a 
while. There is abundant empirical evidence on successful and faded industrial districts—see, 
for instance, Chs 25 to 49 in Becattini et al. (2009) and the references therein. Schmitz (1999) 
discusses this issue extensively and offers an insightful rationale. He claims that joint actions 
undertaken by members of the district, on top of agglomeration economies, are what makes 
the difference in terms of competitiveness success. These are deliberate actions consciously 
and explicitly agreed among cluster members to achieve efficiency gains for them. Such joint 
actions can be an agreement between four small shirt makers to divide a single large order, a 
research centre set up by a pool of shirt and fabric makers to develop new textile products or 
the co-ordinated presence of the industrial district in an international business exhibition. The 
keyword here is cooperation. Joint actions are the outcome of cooperation between cluster 
members. Co-operation may involve competitors only (horizontal cooperation) or the junction 
of deliberate and coordinated actions by input producers and users or output producers and 
buyers (vertical cooperation). We should bear in mind that cooperation does not preclude 
competition between members. Based on facts accounted for in the empirical literature, we 
may conclude that competitive clusters are those that succeed to combine cooperation with 
rivalry. 
So, properly combined,  external economies and joint actions produce collective efficiency, 
which is a source of individual and group competitiveness as we have just discussed. Figure 1 
illustrates the argument. The social environment, defined as the set of social relations between 
economic agents, is the playing field where collective efficiency emerges to trigger positive 
effects on variables such as innovation, scale, and internationalisation. Improvements on these 
variables ultimately lead to competitiveness enhancements. We are therefore reasoning in the 
context of endogenous development factors. 
We now give a step further to enter more explicitly the regional development arena. Schmitz 
has developed his concept of collective efficiency considering one category only of economic 
agents: firms. However, other types of players behave in real-world clusters and coordinated 
actions across agent types can trigger benefits for all as well. For example, local governments 
can be useful partners to help firms to grow and compete if public money follows private 
action.  This  can  be  the  case  of  a  partnership  between  the  enterprises  association  and  a 
municipality to build and run an exhibitions facility. The municipality may pay for the land use 
and  the  firms  for  the  building  and  operation  costs.  This  facility  may  help  to  diffuse 
internationally  the  competences  of  the  territory,  to  incubate  new  firms  and  to  house  a 
technological development centre. Another interesting kind of players is a research centre or a 8 
 
higher education unit. Appropriate, tailor made contracts with some or all clustered firms can 
be an effective way to transfer knowledge into mercantile goods and leverage a sustained 
inflow  of  innovation  to  clustered  firms.  We  think  it  is  appropriate  to  speak  of  collective 
efficiency as well when multi-institutional cooperation is in place. 
Figure 1—The transmission mechanism of collective efficiency 
 
A  second  generalisation  of  this  concept  comes  to  mind  when  we  think  of  the  increasing 
number of transactions carried out before computer screens. For many activities, information 
and  communication  technologies  provide  efficient  proxies  for  face-to-face  contacts.  Going 
back to our earlier textile example, frequent electronic interactions, combined with just a few 
physical contacts from time to time, are a cheap and yet higher quality device to discuss ideas 
and  experiment  new  product  solutions  between  shirt,  button  and  fabric  makers—to  keep 
using our previous example. Orders can be placed by e-mail, training can be offered remotely, 
labour search can be performed through databases. This means that basically the same kind of 
benefits allowed by agglomeration can be offered by effective network cooperation. Network 
cooperation does not need physical proximity of players but requires explicit, deliberate joint 
actions among partners. Contrary to agglomerations, in this case external effects (which we 
may label as network externalities) do not exist without joint actions, they result from the 
latter.  Appropriate  competitiveness-oriented  joint  actions  can  indeed  generate  a  price 
advantage for networkers, thus qualifying them as another form of collective efficiency. 
To conclude this section on the theoretical background, we come back to Figure 1. Occurrence 
of joint actions requires social interaction. The effectiveness of joint actions as a business 
efficiency  device  depends  a  lot  on  the  quality  of  the  social  environment.  Trust,  sharing 
traditions,  entrepreneurship  spirit,  firm  density,  strength  of  community  institutions  are 














distributed and clusters are very unlike in terms of their composition. Although the Ave Valley 
(Northern Portugal) is an industrial district example, cooperation among residents—including 
firms, municipalities, universities, public and private professional training centres, etc.—is not 
as  strong  as  in  other  cases,  which  may  explain  the  difficulties  the  textile  industry  has 
undergone there over the last 15 years and the relative success in other European districts 
where social capital has been better equipped for joint actions for a longer time.
6 
3  Low density territories 
Local  areas  with  population  densities  between  10  and  80  inhabitants  per  km
2  are  quite 
common worldwide. We can find them in regions such as the Midwest in the USA, Southern 
portion of the Plateau of Mexico, North-eastern Brazil, Central Chile, tropical Western Africa, 
remote  regions  in  Nordic  countries,  Northern  Scotland,  Portuguese-Spanish  cross-border 
territories and parts of the Balkan Peninsula, Eastern European countries, Russia, the Deccan 
Plateau of India and Central China— see data at Travel University (2011). 
Section 1 introduced the development problem we address in this paper. The time has come 
now  to  elaborate more on  its  nature.  We  hope that  the  understanding of  the  underlying 
structural weaknesses, as well as the unexploited endogenous resources in these territories, 
will persuade the reader about the desirability to stimulate collective efficiency solutions. For 
reasons we unearth in the following subsection, the development problem we are talking 
about has an undisputable political dimension in democratic societies. 
3.1  The political problem 
The territories in mind feature population and economic activity losses which tend to self-feed 
in  a  circular  and  cumulative  causation  process.  Figure  2  illustrates  this  vicious  circle.  Low 
density tends to be associated with few jobs which are not enough to accommodate active 
population, young individuals tend to out-migrate, the population stock gets older, there is an 
entrepreneurship  scarcity,  institutional  thickness  is  thin,  private  investment  lacks,  which 
contributes  to  few  jobs  and  the  circle  closes  and  traps  the  territory  into  a  relative 
impoverishing growth path. We may say that low population density regions fitting into this 
pattern are also low economic density territories. 
At this moment, a parenthesis is worth to alert the reader to the fact that not all territories in 
the world with low population densities face a vicious circle. We must be aware that there are 
                                                           
6 See Baleiras (2011a) for a metaphoric yet realistic comparison between the Ave Valley and Treviso 
(north of Italy) textile districts. Forty years ago both territories comprised very similar firm structures 
(family-run  small  clustered  businesses).  Individualistic  tradition  in  the  former  case  and  strong 
cooperation  links  in  the  latter  account  significantly  for  the  different  collective  performances  until 
nowadays. Cooperation in the Portuguese case has improved substantially in recent years but History 
still makes the difference. 10 
 
sparsely-populated places with interesting economic dynamics. Of course, reasons other than 
people  to  land  ratios  interfere  with  economic  performance:  air  rarefaction,  fresh  water 
availability, arable land, relief, etc. are just some natural constraints to the pursuit of economic 
activity. To them, we could add some human decisions that also constrain differently different 
spaces. However, this paper does not aim at explaining the differences. Its goal is to elaborate 
a possible policy response for low population density territories that also display relatively low 
economic indicators. 
Figure 2—The vicious development circle in low density territories 
 
After this parenthesis, let us return to low density territories featuring a vicious development 
circle. Is this economic pattern a political problem? The answer depends on the durability and 
the social outcomes of the vicious circle. It helps to begin addressing this issue by noticing that 
the  circle  in  Figure  2  carries  its  own  solution.  The  dynamics  outlined  above  has  different 
starting  conditions  in  different  places.  But,  once  in  place,  the  impoverishing  drift  sets  in 
motion. For example, the Portuguese territories in this situation entered the circle a long time 
ago and accelerated the relative decaying path in the 20
th century, particularly in the fifties 
when industrialisation and services upsurge drifted millions of people to coastal areas and 
other European countries. So a first answer to the question above would be: forget about low 
density territories and just let them follow their fate. Biology would eventually expel the last 
human being from these peripheral locations and the circle would then come naturally to an 
end. 
This standpoint would just be impossible to support, and for several compelling reasons. First, 
mobility takes generations. The more youth leaves, the higher are the costs for leftovers, costs 













public goods in peripheral territories. Second, this ultra-liberal perspective could be possible in 
the old days of the soviet mass population displacements but are definitely unacceptable in 
any  democratic  society.  Third,  even  if  that  radical  solution  was  implemented,  one  should 
always ask about what would happen to the public goods rural population provides for urban 
citizens. Please bear in mind that people living in rural areas and small towns, despite their 
scarcity, provide a number of precious services to fellow human beings living in large cities and 
metropolitan areas. They keep land arable, sustain biodiversity, prevent massive fire hazards, 
assure human and animal habitat diversity and offer the tranquillity and peace of mind of their 
villages and towns that has long been lost in large urban agglomerations. Thus, biology, the 
natural solution, is unfeasible on political grounds, which leaves policy-makers with a problem 
in hands and the onus of its solution. 
So, the vicious circle in Figure 2 is, indeed, a political problem in democratic societies, at least. 
This  means  policy-makers  have  the  responsibility  of  addressing  the  issue.  Economic 
desertification is not an option! Fortunately, endogenous development theories, in particular 
the collective efficiency argument, provide inspiration to believe that economic desertification 
is not a fatality. Through the wised mobilisation of endogenous forces, adequately coupled 
with alien energy, it is possible to break in the circle and inbreathe business creation dynamics 
and integrated development elements to those spaces. Economic desertification is fightable by 
fostering cohesion therein but the sustainability of this fight commands their competitiveness 
improvement. Competitiveness is not a need or aim of the most developed territories; it is a 
need and aim of all places. This idea is very much the political orientation for cohesion policy 
since 2007 and is stressed by both the Barca report and the conclusions of the fifth cohesion 
report. 
3.2  Endogenous resources and a sketch of public action 
Happily, disadvantages are not the only endowment of low density territories. They may own a 
number of assets highly appraised by native and alien consumers. Take the case, for example, 
of  an  outstanding  natural  park,  a  breathtaking  humanised  landscape,  a  constellation  of 
remarkable castles and palaces, a collection of traditional expertise so often linked to gourmet 
agro-industrial,  handicraft  and  other  terroir  products.  These  tangible  or  intangible  assets 
portray unique features that prevent their replication elsewhere in the foreseeable future. 
Many people in rural and urban areas derive utility out of these resources and are willing to 
pay for them, either by making visitations and promenades through such places or buying 
remotely goods and services produced out of those special resources. If that is so, it makes 
sense to work out a collective strategy to extract economic value from these endogenous 
resources mainly to the benefit of residents in their vicinities. In this vision, such resource is 
the anchor to structure a whole chain of complementary goods and services to be provided by 
many players in the territory. It makes sense to congregate the interests of tens of firms and 
non-profitable organisations (social and public sectors) around an action programme anchored 12 
 
on one or two endogenous resources and headed for business delivery and the attraction of 
visitors and additional enterprises. The call to collective efficiency makes sense here. Both the 
private and the social productivity of an euro of investment is higher when such money is 
invested in a coordinated manner with many other players’ actions than when that euro is just 
a one-agent’s isolated decision. 
Moreover, the economic performance of low density territories cannot be limited to the action 
of resident agents. Attraction of alien initiatives,  from  either more urbanised areas in the 
country  or  abroad,  is  highly  desirable.  Their  self  interest  to  join  the  collective  action 
programme should be actively sought by the partnership leaders. 
This is what a judicious public action in favour of virtuous inflows to the vicious circle is about. 
Such policy tool should be designed to challenge development players (resident as well as non-
resident  private,  social  and  public  organisations)  to  build  partnerships  capable  of  running 
action  programmes;  action  programmes  whose  strategic  focus  should  be  the  economic 
valuation  of  singular  territorial  assets;  action  programmes  whose  underlying  economic 
rationale should be collective efficiency as defined earlier; action programmes whose public 
investment contents should complement private investment’s and not the other way round 
because sustained job and wealth creation is their ultimate goal. The success of a collective 
efficiency strategy like this would be measured by its capacity to cut off the vicious circle of 
impoverishing development, i.e. by the effectiveness of its impact on the social and economic 
regeneration of a low density territory. In the end, such places are likely to still display lower 
population to land ratios but the bottom line purpose is to reverse their absolute economic 
decline and even their relative economic position vis-à-vis urbanised areas. 
3.3  Cross-border territories 
There are low density territories trapped with the vicious development circle far away from EU 
domestic borders as well as close to them. In both cases, as it will become clear in the next 
section,  cohesion  policy  can  make  a  tremendous  difference.  However,  the  way  territorial 
cooperation instruments work so far jeopardises the policy effectiveness in the case of border 
regions. This is why cross-border rural areas present the most interesting case from a trans-
European viewpoint. The policy formulation for border areas combines the recommendations 
we will put forward in the next section for all zones with several others that gear territorial 
cooperation  tools.  In  this  subsection,  we  restrict  ourselves  to  justify  the  peculiarities  of 
collective efficiency partnerships aiming to the competitiveness of cross-border low density 
territories and the difficulties the current territorial cooperation framework imposes. 
Only  by  chance  does  an  inter-Member  State  border  line  mark  the  end  of  an  anchor 
endogenous resource market influence. In most actual cases, economic geography on one side 
of  the  border  continues  to  the  other  side  and  the  same  may  also  apply  to  the  physical 13 
 
presence of the resource. Indeed, a number of classified natural parks cross the line, the same 
happens with underground water with spa properties and a collection of outstanding castles or 
palaces, just to name a few examples. Why should an eligible private-social-public partnership 
be prevented to include agents from the neighbouring territory? Such inclusion makes sense 
because  it  contributes  to  scale  up  and  give  critical  mass  to  the  integrated  development 
approach.  Please  remember  that  agents  scarcity  is  precisely  one  of  the  most  binding 
constraints in these territories. Such inclusion contributes also to reinforce the citizens’ sense 
of  belonging  to  a  common  European space.  Remember that,  despite the  huge  progresses 
fostered  by  INTERREG  A  successive  editions,  borders  are  still  an  obstacle  to  the  full 
accomplishment of the single market. Cross-border collective efficiency strategies could also 
pave the way to expand the benefits of the common market to these areas. 
However, the European territorial cooperation instruments are not ready to help to stimulate 
such  strategies.  Firms  are  probably  the  only  indispensable  category  of  players  in  those 
partnerships because they aim to gear businesses and jobs. Current cross-border operational 
programmes (OP) exclude state aids from their support portfolios, which is a major deterrent 
to the integration of cross-border private agents. Moreover, many of these programmes either 
replicate  the  eligibilities of  national  OP or,  by  contrast,  virtually  exclude  material  projects 
because  of  financial  endowment  shortage  or  strategic  orientation.  An  adequate 
complementarity with national OP seems to be failing, particularly with those having a regional 
constituency. It is possible to design a new framework more friendly to this end. We will come 
back to this issue in the next section. 
The partnerships we have in mind may also benefit from developing immaterial projects with 
agents in more distant Member States or even third countries. Take the case of a Polish-
German partnership based in the economic enhancement of Romanic heritage and comprising 
a number of small rural and nature lodging units. There are cultural tourism funs all over the 
world but it is quite difficult to know where these lodging units are. A common marketing and 
booking unit participated by members of that partnership and associations of rural, manor 
houses  or  nature  lodging  facilities  in  other  countries  can  be  a  mutually  advantageous 
immaterial  project.  The  unit  could  combine  complementary  offers  for  all.  Yet,  without  a 
community strategic guideline right from the outset of the programming period, stating some 
preference to involvement with collective efficiency partnerships in Member States (or across 
neighbouring  Member  States),  it  is  too  hard  to  convince  managing  authorities  about  the 
goodness of such intentions. Furthermore, the concept of collective efficiency strategies is 
unknown,  not  to  say  unrecognised  by  managing  authorities.  So  some  form  of  European 
recommendation,  as  it  has  been  done  recently  with  the  European  Territorial  Cooperation 
Grouping, is probably necessary. 14 
 
4  A  new  policy  approach  to  address  the  vicious  development 
problem 
The fifth cohesion report is very encouraging about the Commission’s resolution to welcome 
policy  tools  as  sketched  in  Subsection  3.2.  For  instance,  when  putting  forward  reform 
guidelines for the next programming period, European Commission (2010b, pp. xx and xxi) 
states: “The trend towards a more balanced mix, including financial engineering (loans and 
venture capital) as well as more indirect measures, such as advice and guidance and support 
for  networking  and  clustering,  is  a  welcome  one”.  The  policy  approach  we  have  in  mind 
combines,  precisely,  advice  and  guidance  and  support  for  networking  and  clustering  with 
access to cohesion funds. This section aims at presenting the broad lines of this approach. 
4.1  Anchorage to EU cohesion policy 
Collective efficiency strategies in low density territories matter for EU cohesion policy. Two 
reasons justify their anchorage to this policy: money and guidance. Let us see both of them in 
turn. 
The financial instruments of EU cohesion policy are the most important funding mechanism of 
national regional development policies in most Member States, particularly those applicable to 
Convergence  regions.  The  policy  approach  proposed  in  this  paper  has  necessarily  to  be 
articulated with National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRF). This is so because, as was 
made clear before, bottom-up partnerships aim to invest and run other structural actions to 
induce virtuous development patterns in low density territories. Very likely, many of such 
actions  will  be  eligible  to  individual  OP.  Thus,  it  is  highly  recommendable,  both  from  an 
European  and  a  national  authority  perspective,  that  the  access  of  those  actions  to  NSRF 
funding will be judiciously stimulated and organised. 
Moreover,  the  link  to  such  collective  efficiency  initiatives  matters  to  cohesion  policy 
irrespectively of funding. As is clear in the quotation above, the future cohesion policy should 
be prepared to provide coaching to promising networking and clustering practices. So national 
and regional authorities have here an excellent opportunity to implement that principle. Some 
roles are suggested in the following subsections. 
4.2  Opportunity  to  improve  coordination  with  other  European 
policies 
Until  the  end  of  the  2000/2006  programming  period,  the  community  funds  for  rural 
development and structural actions in the fisheries sector were a formal part of the so-called 
Community Support Frameworks and shared sectoral and regional operational programmes 
with cohesion policy funds. In December 2005, the European Council decided the secession of 15 
 
agricultural and fisheries policies funds from combined structural interventions and this is why 
the  current  European  Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development  (EAFRD)  and  the  European 
Fisheries Fund (EFF) are absent from NSRF in all Member States. From the point of view of a 
modern regional development policy, this has been a harmful decision but this is not the place 
to pursue the matter. We are raising the issue here simply because the target territories for 
this new policy approach are typically eligible for EAFRD or EFF incentives. So the political 
stimulation  at  the  community  level  of  collective  efficiency  partnerships  in  rural  areas,  as 
advocated  here,  provides  an  excellent  opportunity  to  re-establish  the  coordination  across 
structural policies from below. By the way, the experience of local actions groups with Leader 
operations can be extremely valuable to help structuring collective efficiency partnerships. At 
the same time, it is worth mentioning that the economic problem tackled in this paper (Figure 
2) says a lot to the ends of the European Social Fund. So it s is highly advisable to bring the 
respective community and national authorities onboard. 
All it needs is a Commission’s initiative to propose the encouragement of collective efficiency 
partnerships in an appropriate policy paper and, hopefully, its acceptance by the (European) 
Council.  The  policy  document  we  are  talking  about  is  the  Common  Strategic  Framework. 
Specific national declinations to the Development and Investment Partnership Contracts to be 
signed afterwards with individual Member States would reinforce the political orientation. 
These documents were proposed by the European Commission in their conclusions to the fifth 
cohesion report—European Commission (2010b, p. xxiv). 
4.3  Basic eligibility requirements 
In our view, the top-down guidelines for this public policy instrument should include two kinds 
of eligibility rules to be met by prospective partnerships: one related to agents and the other 
to territories. 
Given the clear orientation of the policy instrument towards competitiveness, private firms are 
the  only  economic  agent  class  that  cannot  be  prevented  to  enter  a  collective  efficiency 
partnership.  Other  agent  categories  (non-profit  organisations,  including  municipalities  and 
public agencies) should be allowed to participate inasmuch as their mission contributes to the 
goals of the policy instrument and taking into consideration the OP beneficiary eligibility rules. 
Now, as far as the territory is concerned, the rules should help to concentrate the positive 
economic effects of the partnership actions within the low density territories featuring the 
vicious  development  problem  depicted  in  Figure  2.  We  should  rely  on  subsidiarity  for  an 
effective national translation of this principle. Support on spatial planning instruments and 
some rules on population density and other economic indicators could help to define eligible 
territories. Of course, some spillover effects to neighbouring or even distant urban territories 16 
 
may be acceptable, especially if one wants to attract exogenous investment, provided the 
outside benefits do not dominate. 
4.4  Action programmes 
Each candidate partnership must introduce itself to the relevant authorities in charge of this 
policy instrument with a well-founded action programme. Such document should include, at 
least, the following elements: 
  Diagnosis of the target vicious circle; 
  Strategy  to  overcome  the  problem,  including  alignment  with  relevant  public 
policies; 
  Scope and ends of the partnership (including target indicators); 
  Self-governance model and leadership (how do partners get organised, how are 
collective decisions made, who coordinates what); 
  Action and project files (synopses of major structural actions the partnerships aims 
to run; include initiatives eligible as well as non-eligible to public co-funding); 
  Indicative demand for public grant (a tentative budget, including amounts and 
names of possible EU co-financing sources including a sound justification for public 
money involvement). 
This document is important because it represents the raison d’être of the actual partnership. It 
sends relevant messages to inside and outside players. On the one hand, as the programme is 
undersigned by all members, it binds them to meet their purposes and respect the governance 
model. On the other, it is the presentation card of the partnership to the local community and 
authorities. The action programme is the cement that links joint actions and provides the 
strategic guidelines necessary to ensure the complementarities across individual projects and 
actions. 
It seems recommendable that, at some stage in the preparation of this document, the partners 
approach a relevant public authority to seek advice on its contents. Preferably, this authority 
should  be  independent  from  structural  funds  management  to  avoid  interests  conflict; 
experience with regional development tools implementation would be a plus. This authority 
may  be  given  a  wider  role  as  well  with  respect  to  the  implementation  of  the  collective 
efficiency policy tool—see more in Subsection 4.8 below. 
4.5  Access  to  cohesion  and  other  European  structure-purposed 
financing 
Probably,  many  projects  in  an  action  programme  will  be  candidates  to  incentives  by 
structurally-oriented European (and Member State) policies. In this subsection, let us say a few 17 
 
words  about  how  the  access  to  cohesion,  rural  development  and  fisheries  policy  funding 
should be organised. 
Firstly, some sort of official recognition of the action programme could be thought of at the 
end of its preparation. If one wants to stimulate collective efficiency approaches, one must be 
prepared  to  grant  some  positive  discrimination  access  to  financing  tools  and  other  public 
policy encouragement measures. This is so because it is much easier for each partner to draft 
alone its investment project or structural action, neglect the internalisation of external effects 
and apply isolated to that public policy tool. Naturally, if public policies grant the same benefits 
to  isolated  and  coordinated  joint  actions, we can  bet  for  sure  that  almost nobody would 
bother to travel through the harder road of cooperating with other agents. Public interest 
would suffer a loss from such an attitude. 
So, one needs a sound accreditation mechanism to give credit and respect to the structural 
interventions  the  partnership  intends  to  run.  Hence,  we  suggest  that  action  programmes 
should go through a credibility screening in order to gain access to the benefits of public 
policies.  Also  the  partners’  commitment  with  implementation  time  lengths  is  advisable—
maximum terms could be set in the top-down policy guidelines. Again, given the significant 
cultural  and  institutional  differences  within  Europe,  one  should  rely  on  subsidiarity  to 
implement this concern in an appropriate manner. 
Secondly,  the  collective  efficiency  rationale  of  these  partnerships  facilitates  the 
implementation and monitoring of impact indicators, something Europe needs to improve in 
the next programming period. Incidentally, the nature of these action programmes paves the 
way  to  implement  performance  strengthening  via  conditionality  and  incentives  as  the 
Commission puts forward in European Commission (2010b, p. xxv). 
Thirdly, the positive discrimination access we are thinking of comprises at least one of the 
following forms: higher subsidy rates, reserved calling periods or reserved auction funding 
endowments. Other means are, of course, foreseeable. Some benefits could be granted to one 
type of projects, others to different actions, according to policy preferences (for example, 
more discrimination to private than to public projects if one wants public investment to follow 
private investment and not the other way round). 
Fourthly,  access  to  funding  from  these  policies  should  be  open  to  collective  efficiency 
partnerships  on  a  competitive  basis.  The  eventual  positive  discriminations  in  favour  of 
collective actions cannot be seen as a green channel to taxpayers’ money. On the contrary, 
only the best action programmes should be selected and a close scrutiny of individual actions, 
at  the  OP  application  time,  is  indispensable.  This  means  that  only  a  fraction  of  eligible 
territories will be covered by funded action programmes. 18 
 
Fifthly, the selection process should send learning signs to prospective candidates. We are 
talking about complex mobilisation of economic agents. Errors are very likely to occur. So, 
from a social perspective, it looks important to embody learning opportunities for all relevant 
players. As far as beneficiaries are concerned, a funding rejection one day may be instructive 
as  to  upgrade  the  action  programme  or  any  individual  project  to  win  in  a  future  (call) 
opportunity. 
Finally, individual action applications to relevant OP auctions should comply with the existing 
framework. In particular, applications should respect eligibilities and selection criteria in force 
on existing OP. Of course, OP regulations should be prepared to welcome collective action 
applications consistent with Community and Member State policy goals. This important issue 
of institutional design deserves a subsection of its own to which we now turn. 
4.6  Flexible Operational Programmes use 
The  policy  instrument we  envisage  here  is  open  to  any economic sector,  any  eligible  low 
density  territory  and  any  eligible  investment  or  structural  action  typology.  A  collective 
efficiency strategy, by its nature, comprehends an integrated development approach from 
below, though taking relevant public policy guidelines into consideration. As such, it is not up 
to the central or a regional government to decide which sector, location or typologies to 
include in an action programme. By the way, the time for governments to nominate national 
champions at the forefront was gone from modern industrial policy some years ago. 
Ex ante, this means many diverse bottom-up structural intervention proposals may come up. 
In terms of economic activity sectors, there may be action programmes focused on fisheries, 
tourism,  creative  industries,  textiles  or  even on multiple  sectors.  Operational  programmes 
have a pre-determined geographical jurisdiction very much based on administrative criteria; 
only  by  chance  will  the  administrative  borders  coincide  with  the  frontiers  of  integrated 
development  programmes.  Moreover,  typically  NSRF  structural  intervention  typologies  are 
allocated to different OP and a relevant action programme may combine typologies belonging 
to different OP. 
We thus mean that all this heterogeneity across action programmes is not a bad thing and that 
a good action programme may contain valid projects whose eligibility lies in different OP
7, 
either because of sectoral, regional or typological reasons. So, the potential overlapping of OP 
jurisdictions is something public authorities should expect and should be prepared to deal 
with.  Adequate  response  requires  flexibility  in  funds  management,  both  during  the 
institutional and operational design stage and the implementation period. 
                                                           
7 For the purpose of this subsection, we are referring to NSRF plus Rural Development and Fisheries 
operational programmes. If other relevant European policies get associated with cohesion policy in the 
forthcoming Common Strategic Framework, coordination with their financial instruments should also be 
addressed in actual designs at the national level of the policy tool proposed in this paper. 19 
 
As far as the preparation stage is concerned, we may recommend an operational architecture 
thematically  focused  to  avoid  excessive  fragmentation,  particularly  in  terms  of  economic 
activity sectors and public policies. The current mono-fund rule does not help but, if one needs 
to keep it for other reasons, perhaps it would be a good idea to increase the inter-fund use 
flexibility degree. During the implementation period, the potential OP jurisdiction overlapping 
inherent to integrated development planning must be taken seriously into consideration by 
national  authorities.  The analysis  of  individual  projects  belonging  to  a  collective  efficiency 
strategy by different managing authorities must preserve the completeness of the collective 
strategy.  If  too  many  complementary  projects  get  different  decisions  in  different  OP,  the 
coherence  of  the  collective  strategy  may  become  at  stake.  A  careful  articulation  among 
managing authorities, the regional public agency in charge of the policy instrument and the 
partnership leader is necessary to assure adequate coordination. The accreditation mechanism 
proposed in Subsection 4.4 should be explored with this purpose in mind. 
4.7  Adaptation  of  European  territorial  cooperation  operational 
programmes 
As  mentioned  before,  the  European  territorial  cooperation  OP  need  some  adjustments  in 
order to add effectiveness to a policy action headed to the economic and political problem of 
cross-border low density territories. 
First, consider cross-border OP. European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) endowments 
defined and managed on a national basis do not facilitate cross-border collective efficiency 
strategies. There are other arguments to defend the endowment management on the basis of 
the eligible cooperation space but there is no room here to open its discussion. The bottom 
line  message  that  matters  for  the  purpose  of  this  paper  is  that  a  joint  cross-border 
management of the fund endowment on the basis of application merits increases the number 
of interesting applications to these OP. However, the policy instrument we propose here can 
also  survive  with  the  current  arrangement,  although,  in  this  case,  a  strict  and  formal 
coordination mechanism with regional OP managing authorities is highly recommended when 
the cross-border OP involves disproportionate endowments on the two (or more) sides of the 
border. The regional OP need to intervene and compensate for those disproportions. 
As was made clear in Subsection 4.3 above, private firms must take part in collective efficiency 
partnerships. Currently, their involvement with cross-border OP is virtually null, to the best of 
our  knowledge.  The  absence  of  a  clear  European-wide  guideline  with  respect  to  the 
participation of these OP in the allocation of state aids and the complexity of their running left 
managing  authorities  uncomfortable  with  the  possibility  of  granting  subsidies  to  private 
investment. This situation would need to be reviewed for the next programming period if the 
policy initiative put forward here is to be implemented in cross-border territories as well. 
Either cross-border OP will include state aids (for example, with the help of the specialised 20 
 
technical bodies that already analyse firm applications for mainstream OP) or the national OP 
equipped with state aids would need to be brought onboard through an effective institutional 
coordination mechanism. 
At last, one word for interregional OP. The example at the end of Subsection 3.3 highlighted 
the desirability of allowing partners in a collective efficiency strategy (involving or not cross-
border territories) to find synergies for immaterial projects with economic agents in distant 
foreign regions, even outside the EU. The following interregional OP generation should lay 
down  some  guidelines  on  how those  complementarities  could  benefit  from their  financial 
stimulus  provided,  of  course,  there  is  a  social  benefit  to  justify  that  taxpayers’  money 
allocation. 
4.8  Boosting and assessment 
At the end of Subsection 4.4 we have suggested a coaching role with respect to the maturation 
of  action  programmes  should  be  played  by  a  public  agency  engaged  with  regional 
development fostering. In our view, this body could also provide more services to the benefit 
of the collective efficiency strategy policy tool. The mobilisation of these partnerships is a 
complex task both during the preparation period and the implementation period. Mobilisation 
requires the full attention, in the first hand, from the partners’ own coordination committee. 
Yet,  inasmuch  as  the  success  of  these  strategies  becomes  a  public  policy  concern,  the 
government should empower an appropriate public agency with the mission of assisting and 
encouraging the effective agents’ mobilisation. Depending on the size of the country and the 
ideal number of partnerships the policy tool may accommodate, these tasks can be assigned to 
several  regionally-based  public  agencies  with  a  thorough  knowledge  of  development 
challenges  and  players  within  their  geographic  jurisdictions.  It  is  important  to  let  these 
agencies to network, to perform their job in a coordinated manner among themselves and 
with  the  active  interest  of  the  government  member  in  charge  of  regional  development. 
Agents, particularly in low density, often remote territories with respect to access to central 
government members, need to feel the government’s interest in their initiative. 
During the preparation period, the agency(ies) should listen  to the prospective territories’ 
voice with respect to policy guidelines draft versions and offer its knowledge and experience to 
help seducing partners and writing action programmes. The agency becomes useful again in 
the run-up to the accreditation proposal to help securing realistic and strategically focused 
action programmes. 
During the implementation period, there are two tasks this agency should play: boosting and 
interim  assessment.  The  complexity  of  collective  actions  requires  moral  incentive, 
benchmarking information and effective help in the dialogue between partnerships’ leading 
committees, managing authorities, intermediate and technical bodies involved with structural 21 
 
funds operations. As mentioned before, the official recognition of an action programme should 
provide some positive discrimination incentives to collective actions. However, conditionality 
rules  should  apply  to  them.  One  important  condition  is  an  external  assessment  of  the 
implementation performance of each recognised action programme to be carried out at an 
intermediate time of the action programme life. The public agency we are referring to should 
be in charge of organising the assessment exercise and use own and independent expertise in 
this  task.  A  centrally-coordinated  assessment  exercise  involving  all  homologous  agencies 
should be considered so as to optimise expertise use and facilitate good practices diffusion in a 
later moment. It is important to make clear to everybody right from the beginning that this 
assessment brings consequences to public money support.  The assessment outcomes may 
justify a revision of granted privileges or a review of the action programme itself. The existence 
of consequences gives credibility to the assessment exercise and, more important, provides 
strong  incentives  for  partners  to  play  seriously  in the  implementation of their  investment 
projects and other structural actions. 
5  Concluding remarks 
This paper has brought attention to a political problem facing many low density territories in 
Europe. They are suffering for many years from a cumulative causation development dynamics 
that brings relative impoverishment when compared to typical urbanised areas, if not absolute 
life quality decline. 
Yet, very often, such territories house valuable tangible and intangible assets which are pivotal 
to build effective solutions to break in the vicious circle. Based on the collective efficiency 
concept, and bottom-up smart partnerships, cohesion policy stands in an privileged position to 
provide guidance on how to solve the development problem. 
An appropriate public initiative with this purpose in mind was proposed in this paper: the 
collective  efficiency  strategy.  This  policy  tool  is  solidly  aligned  with  the  Europe  2020 
development vision, soundly anchored in EU cohesion policy and mobilises the coordination 
with  other  structurally-oriented  policies  such  as  employment,  professional  training,  rural 
development  and  fisheries,  as  vindicated  in  the  EU  Budget  Review.  However,  its 
implementation requires a few lines in relevant top-European level political documents. The 
spirit of the proposed policy initiative and some top-down orientations would be very useful in 
the forthcoming Common Strategic Framework and Development and Investment Partnership 
Contracts. 
The suggestions provided in this paper are feasible during the current programming period, 
although in a much suboptimal way (especially close to borders). To prove it, there is a specific 22 
 
policy instrument already implemented in one Member State along these lines: the PROVERE 
initiative in Portugal, launched in 2008—see references in footnote 2. 
To conclude, let us stress how our proposal fits in the strategic European framework to be in 
place  for  the  next  ten  years  which  is  currently  adopted  or  still  under  discussion.  Firstly, 
consider the Europe 2020 document, already endorsed by the European Council. The policy 
proposal  at  hands  helps  Europe  to  deliver  smart,  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth  and 
development on the ground. Smart as the tool induces innovative territorial specialisation 
which generates economic value from relatively idle endogenous assets; sustainable because 
the marketability of collective efficiency activities is based on the durability of natural, heritage 
and man-made resources; inclusive inasmuch as the business and job creation focus will help 
to renew population and bring people back to the labour market in socially fragile territories. 
Secondly, look at the fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion. The European 
Commission have put forward therein very inspiring recommendations concerning the future 
of cohesion policy—European Commission (2010c). We know the conclusions in this document 
follow a three-year long strategic debate with Member States and other relevant stakeholders
8 
which seem to endorse those  advices .  We believe  the policy tool this paper proposes 
contributes actively to the delivery of the outlined recommendations for the future cohesion 
policy. In particular, we find comfort in the following ideas of European Commission (2010c): 
  Increased thematic concentration (heading 2.2); 
  Strengthening performance through conditionality and incentives (heading 2.3); 
  Strengthening governance (heading 3); 
Our  proposal  provides  an  innovative  device  to  foster  territorial  cohesion  (heading  3.1), 
addresses the need for greater flexibility in the organisation of programming instruments (p. 
xxix), suggests one way to deal with  geographical and demographic features (p. xxix) and 
contains tangible suggestions on how to improve local development approaches (pp. xxix and 
xxx). 
Finally, have a look at the EU Budget Review. Pp. 11 and 13 in European Commission (2010b) 
recommend a stronger, more effective policy coordination among the major community funds 
for structural actions and encourage Member States to use the Common Strategic Framework 
to bring more rationality to their use. We could not agree more with this viewpoint as regional 
development commands integrated policy approaches. Yet, we know by own experience the 
political  difficulties  the  Council  and  (national)  central  governments  have  had  so  far  to 
coordinate  effectively  those  funds.  We  strongly  believe  that  development  players  on  the 
                                                           
8 We feel very honoured for having had the chance of participating personally in the initial stages of that 
discussion.  The  debate  on  the  post-2013  cohesion  policy  was  launched  during  the  Portuguese 
presidency of the EU Council (Cohesion Forum, September 2007). 23 
 
ground are wiser to find out actual opportunities to deliver that coordination. The proposal in 
this paper—Subsections 4.2 and 4.5—shows one way to allow them to do so. 
For these reasons, we hope the European institutions may find here some useful hints to draft 
the future cohesion policy architecture. 
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